You can access the greenhouse gas (GHG) prices and the other components of the locational marginal pricing (LMP) in any of the time series views, such as Time Series Analysis and Nodal Profile in PowerSignals, as well as in DataSignals API and Cloud. Yes Energy is also working on integrating the GHG prices into the map and in our Price Table module in PowerSignals.

With EDAM's launch, the internal interties between participating EDAM Balancing Authority Areas (BAA) have become transfer locations, which support the optimized transfer of energy and capacity (IR and RC) across the EDAM footprint. EDAM internal transfer locations are no longer biddable locations for imports or exports, with an exception at the Mona and Crag View interties during an initial transitional period. Bids associated with internal EDAM resources are now submitted at the physical generator's location in the EDAM footprint.

During the initial transitional period, if the source of the generation is not known, intertie bids are allowed for resource adequacy (RA) imports into the CAISO BAA and imports supporting renewable portfolio standard (RPS) contracts. Also, during this transitional period, intertie schedules on the CAISO interties will continue being modeled under the SP-Tie model.

Intertie bids will continue to be supported at EDAM external interties and are modeled under the GAP-Tie model.

Carbon-emitting resources can submit a GHG bid adder to serve load in a GHG regulation area that they are not physically located within. If awarded, the emitting resource would be paid its LMP, which would include the Marginal GHG Cost (MGC) component. While this may increase the resource's revenues, the MGC is designed to recover the carbon compliance costs that those emitting resources incur under a state carbon pricing program, rather than serving additional profit.

Emitting resources outside the GHG area can optionally include the GHG adder, but emitting resources inside the GHG area serving internal load have GHG compliance costs baked into their offers.

Load inside the GHG area will pay more, but the MGC is meant to shield external load, as they don’t have to pay for the incremental costs of resources serving load in the carbon-regulated states.

Yes, the MGC can and will differ between states with distinct GHG regulation standards. Currently, the California cap-and-trade program and the Washington cap-and-invest program do not recognize each other's compliance instruments, so the different GHG regulation areas have separate daily GHG allowance index prices (this could change as soon as 2027, however, as officials are working towards linking the California, Washington, and Québec carbon markets). Subsequently, the market allows emitting resources to submit distinct GHG bid adders and bid capacities to serve load in the different GHG regulation areas. Because the MGC is defined as the shadow price of the GHG Transfer allocation constraint for a specific GHG Regulation Area, the MGC is calculated independently by the GHG area.

If the Marginal GHG Cost (MGC) is positive, an emitting resource from outside of the GHG regulation area is the marginal unit setting the price. Only resources with a non-zero GHG emissions rate can submit GHG bid adders greater than $0, and resources inside a GHG regulation area can’t submit a GHG bid adder to serve load within their own GHG area.

If the MGC is $0, it usually means the marginal unit is zero-carbon, but not necessarily. Submitting a GHG adder is voluntary, so a gas resource could choose to submit a $0 GHG bid adder to improve the odds of being dispatched. The MGC will also be $0 if the GHG Regulation Area is a net exporter, or if the GHG area is net importing but the shadow price of the allocation constraint is zero (meaning there is no difference in the marginal cost of energy inside and outside the GHG area).

We expect EDAM to influence inter-regional trading volumes over time. The initial phase focuses on improving transparency in day-ahead market signals. As participants learn from these signals, market design can evolve to better incentivize efficient generation and power transfers across regions. While trading volumes may not shift significantly in the first year, growth is expected in subsequent years.

Direct comparisons to MISO or PJM are difficult due to fundamental topological differences between the Eastern Interconnection and WECC. EDAM is designed specifically for the needs of Western Balancing Authorities and Transmission Service Providers. Unlike the West, PJM and MISO have more interconnection points across their systems, enabling greater opportunities for scheduled power transfers.

There are no changes to virtual trading within CAISO—they remain fully supported. However, virtuals can still indirectly influence imbalance reserves by affecting IFM outcomes. Virtual bids and offers may displace physical supply, altering how energy, ancillary services (AS), and imbalance reserves (IR) clear. EDAM participation will shift CAISO congestion patterns by expanding the day-ahead optimization footprint, improving efficiency and reliability. Enhanced intertie modeling will also produce more accurate power flows and congestion pricing. EDAM entities may choose whether to allow virtuals in their BAA upon entry or operate without them for up to two years, pending broader policy decisions.

Due to the creation of the new Imbalance Reserve Product, we can expect there to be some directional impacts at the hubs, in the positive direction due to this additional flexible capacity now being held back in the IFM. The largest price impacts will be time- and location- dependent, because congestion related to Imbalance Reserve procurement will materialize where forecast uncertainty is greatest.

Imbalance reserves are procured based on locational historical and forecasted uncertainty of wind, solar, and load. Transmission capacity is set aside to ensure Imbalance Reserves are deliverable in case they are needed in real-time. Additionally, the introduction of Imbalance Reserves is intended to reduce the need for out-of-market actions in the RUC process. Historically, CAISO operators have manually increased demand forecasts to clear more supply in RUC to account for DA to RT uncertainty, and now Imbalance Reserves will price that uncertainty into the IFM, thus reducing out-of-market actions.

Overall, the market design for EDAM/DAME is intended to create more DAM pricing of flexibility and increased capacity, not less, so overall on average we don’t expect to see significant price disruption as a result of EDAM/DAME, all else constant.

The Tier 1 RUC fee is undergoing significant changes now that RUC will be procuring Reliability Capacity Up (RCU) and Reliability Capacity Down (RCD).

The Tier 1 RUC cost allocation is being split into and RCU Tier 1 Allocation and an RCD Tier 1 Allocation, to cover the costs of procuring RCU and RCD, respectively. Reliability Capacity costs not recovered through the RCU and RCD tier 1 cost allocations will be allocated to Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their metered demand in the relevant trading hour.

See FERC-approved Tariff language for EDAM and DAME section 11.8.6.5.3, Allocation of the RUC Compensation Costs, and Charge Codes 8806 and 8816 for more detail on RUC Tier 1 Cost Allocation.

No, imbalance reserves are only awarded to 15-minute dispatchable physical resources, capped by their 30-minute ramping capability. However, virtuals can still indirectly affect imbalance reserves by influencing IFM outcomes. Virtual bids and offers may displace physical supply, changing how energy, ancillary services (AS), and imbalance reserves (IR) clear.

Yes, IRU and IRD congestion prices will indirectly affect Convergence Bidding settlements through impacting DA congestion patterns. Energy, AS, and Imbalance Reserves (IR) will be co-optimized in the IFM. IR procurement can create additional binding transmission constraints, since the IFM sets aside transmission capacity to ensure RT deliverability of IR incase they are called upon. These binding constraints, reflected in the IRU and IRD congestion prices, will impact DA congestion patterns and how the market optimization clears both physical and virtual energy alongside AS and IR.