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PacifiCorp and CAISO are the first EDAM participants upon go-live, with Portland General Electric joining EDAM in October 2026, and additional entities will join in 2027 and beyond.
EDAM (Extended Day-Ahead Market)
A voluntary regional program that expands CAISO’s day-ahead market across participating Western BAAs.
DAME (Day-Ahead Market Enhancements)
Introduced Imbalance Reserves (IRU/IRD), a new day-ahead product that procures flexible, deliverable capacity in the Integrated Forward Market.
We’ve supported market participants through major market redesigns since 2008 and are actively tracking EDAM and DAME as they evolve. Here are some of the ways we’re helping you navigate this transition:
Market leadership
For more than 15 years, CAISO participants have relied on our expertise through major market changes. We’re focused on always providing trusted data and insights.
Quality data
As a leader in power market data and analytics, we empower customers with visibility into nodal prices, congestion, transmission constraints, outages, and system conditions across CAISO and the broader Western Interconnection.
Expert support
Our team provides ongoing guidance, resources, and hands-on support so you can adapt quickly and confidently—whether you're analyzing market conditions or managing operational processes.
Backed by Proven CAISO and EDAM Experience
Deep experience supporting CAISO MRTU and WEIM participants, trusted by a majority of WEIM and EDAM market participants, and actively supporting customers through EDAM implementation and market transition.
Whether you're trying to understand the mechanics or preparing your trading strategy, we've gathered the most common questions and answers, so you're ready from day one of the western expansion.
Join Yes Energy experts for a focused walkthrough of CAISO EDAM/DAME and how it can impact the way you analyze and interact with market data.
EDAM and DAME introduce new complexity across bidding, settlements, and reporting. Learn what’s changing, where utilities are most exposed, and how to prepare your workflows for day one


We expect EDAM to influence inter-regional trading volumes over time. The initial phase focuses on improving transparency in day-ahead market signals. As participants learn from these signals, market design can evolve to better incentivize efficient generation and power transfers across regions. While trading volumes may not shift significantly in the first year, growth is expected in subsequent years.
Direct comparisons to MISO or PJM are difficult due to fundamental topological differences between the Eastern Interconnection and WECC. EDAM is designed specifically for the needs of Western Balancing Authorities and Transmission Service Providers. Unlike the West, PJM and MISO have more interconnection points across their systems, enabling greater opportunities for scheduled power transfers.
There are no changes to virtual trading within CAISO—they remain fully supported. However, virtuals can still indirectly influence imbalance reserves by affecting IFM outcomes. Virtual bids and offers may displace physical supply, altering how energy, ancillary services (AS), and imbalance reserves (IR) clear. EDAM participation will shift CAISO congestion patterns by expanding the day-ahead optimization footprint, improving efficiency and reliability. Enhanced intertie modeling will also produce more accurate power flows and congestion pricing. EDAM entities may choose whether to allow virtuals in their BAA upon entry or operate without them for up to two years, pending broader policy decisions.
Due to the creation of the new Imbalance Reserve Product, we can expect there to be some directional impacts at the hubs, in the positive direction due to this additional flexible capacity now being held back in the IFM. The largest price impacts will be time- and location- dependent, because congestion related to Imbalance Reserve procurement will materialize where forecast uncertainty is greatest.
Imbalance reserves are procured based on locational historical and forecasted uncertainty of wind, solar, and load. Transmission capacity is set aside to ensure Imbalance Reserves are deliverable in case they are needed in real-time. Additionally, the introduction of Imbalance Reserves is intended to reduce the need for out-of-market actions in the RUC process. Historically, CAISO operators have manually increased demand forecasts to clear more supply in RUC to account for DA to RT uncertainty, and now Imbalance Reserves will price that uncertainty into the IFM, thus reducing out-of-market actions.
Overall, the market design for EDAM/DAME is intended to create more DAM pricing of flexibility and increased capacity, not less, so overall on average we don’t expect to see significant price disruption as a result of EDAM/DAME, all else constant.
The Tier 1 RUC fee is undergoing significant changes now that RUC will be procuring Reliability Capacity Up (RCU) and Reliability Capacity Down (RCD).
The Tier 1 RUC cost allocation is being split into and RCU Tier 1 Allocation and an RCD Tier 1 Allocation, to cover the costs of procuring RCU and RCD, respectively. Reliability Capacity costs not recovered through the RCU and RCD tier 1 cost allocations will be allocated to Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their metered demand in the relevant trading hour.
See FERC-approved Tariff language for EDAM and DAME section 11.8.6.5.3, Allocation of the RUC Compensation Costs, and Charge Codes 8806 and 8816 for more detail on RUC Tier 1 Cost Allocation.
No, imbalance reserves are only awarded to 15-minute dispatchable physical resources, capped by their 30-minute ramping capability. However, virtuals can still indirectly affect imbalance reserves by influencing IFM outcomes. Virtual bids and offers may displace physical supply, changing how energy, ancillary services (AS), and imbalance reserves (IR) clear.
Yes, IRU and IRD congestion prices will indirectly affect Convergence Bidding settlements through impacting DA congestion patterns. Energy, AS, and Imbalance Reserves (IR) will be co-optimized in the IFM. IR procurement can create additional binding transmission constraints, since the IFM sets aside transmission capacity to ensure RT deliverability of IR incase they are called upon. These binding constraints, reflected in the IRU and IRD congestion prices, will impact DA congestion patterns and how the market optimization clears both physical and virtual energy alongside AS and IR.
EDAM and SPP’s Markets+ will reshape the WECC market landscape, dividing it into four distinct markets: CAISO, EDAM, SPP, and Markets+. This structure will create new market seams, and the relative position of Balancing Authorities and Transmission Service Providers to these seams will significantly disrupt existing bilateral trading frameworks.
Understanding the scheduling mechanisms of EDAM and Markets+ is essential for participants in WECC. While these frameworks introduce added complexity, they are critical for calculating day-ahead schedules and revenues across market seams.
Within EDAM, the modeling and scheduling of power imports and exports between Balancing Authority Areas (BAAs) are managed through Transfer System Resources (TSRs). These mechanisms are designed to optimize transfers and fall into four categories based on how capacity is released:
Type 1: Energy transactions handled bilaterally between transmission customers
Type 2: Capacity released by transmission customers for EDAM optimization
Type 3: Capacity eligible for Resource Sufficiency Evaluation (RSE) released by EDAM entities
Type 4: Capacity released by EDAM entities that is not RSE-eligible
The biggest impact to PPA generators is that EDAM is no longer supporting base schedules. Self-scheduling and exercising existing transmission rights can achieve a similar result to base scheduling, but the resources will be settled directly through the market.
All resources within an EDAM BAA must participate in both the DA and RT markets by submitting economic bids or self-schedules. Resources will receive DAM schedules, and so won't need to submit base schedules to the RT WEIM. Additionally, all EDAM participants will either need to be their own scheduling coordinator (SC) or must be represented by an EDAM SC.
No, EDAM is not expected to “dry up” bilateral trading, though some gradual decline may occur as incentives to self-schedule decrease with a larger footprint and growing market confidence.
EDAM is designed to complement bilaterals, with mechanisms that preserve third-party transmission rights and align with open access transmission tariffs. Type 1 transfer system resources (TSRs) support bilateral transactions, allowing transmission customers to self-schedule using their physical and financial rights. While higher-priority schedules may displace physical flows, Type 1 TSRs retain financial rights and remain RSE-eligible.
EDAM also supports inter-scheduling coordinator trades outside the CAISO BAA to facilitate bilateral settlement. Additionally, a transition period will allow contracted RA and RPS imports to be bid at internal EDAM interties (e.g., CAISO–PacifiCorp) to support market launch.
All transactions in CAISO and EDAM—except CRRs—must be conducted through a registered scheduling coordinator (SC), as CAISO settles financially only with SCs. Utilities and IPPs outside EDAM or WEIM must either register as an SC or work with one to submit bids or self-schedules at external interties. The SC assumes full financial responsibility for all schedules, dispatch instructions, and ancillary service awards.
Yes, IPPs in the Desert Southwest can participate in EDAM, but the structure depends on whether the BAA the IPP belongs to is located inside or outside of the EDAM or WEIM market footprint. IPP resources within an EDAM BAA participate similarly to resources in CAISO today. Resources outside the EDAM footprint can still self-schedule or submit economic bids, though requirements vary by intertie type (internal vs. external), host-BAA's market participation, and whether the resource is location-specific. EDAM does not allow base scheduling—resources must actively participate and be registered for both EDAM and WEIM, as day-ahead schedules create real-time obligations. In all cases, resources must secure transmission to the EDAM boundary and will be subject to EDAM transmission access charges.
We expect these changes to begin with the market go-live on May 1, 2026.
We expect these changes to begin with the market go-live on May 1, 2026.
EDAM is not a one-time implementation, and teams should plan for ongoing change, especially in the early phases.
While the market will eventually mature, it won't stabilize immediately after go-live. CAISO will continue refining the market through updates, corrections, and enhancements as participants begin operating. Over time, EDAM will stabilize. But in the near term, success will depend less on how well you implement the market and more on how effectively you can adapt to continuous change.
You can find out more information by going to the Yes Energy help system (Yes Energy login required). You can also reach out to your dedicated account manager or support@yesenergy.com.
We expect these changes to begin with the market go-live on May 1, 2026.
EDAM is not a one-time implementation, and teams should plan for ongoing change, especially in the early phases.
While the market will eventually mature, it won't stabilize immediately after go-live. CAISO will continue refining the market through updates, corrections, and enhancements as participants begin operating. Over time, EDAM will stabilize. But in the near term, success will depend less on how well you implement the market and more on how effectively you can adapt to continuous change.
You can find out more information by going to the Yes Energy help system (Yes Energy login required). You can also reach out to your dedicated account manager or support@yesenergy.com.
Schedule your demo today to see how our power market data solutions help you remain ahead.