You can find out more information by going to the Yes Energy help system (Yes Energy login required). You can also reach out to your dedicated account manager or support@yesenergy.com.

Yes, there will still be a price adder report post-RTC. While the market trials version of this report is currently included in Group 1, the post-RTC production version of this report will be included in Group 3 (available after go-live). The EMIL ID will remain NP6-323-CD but the report name will change from "Real-Time ORDC and Reliability Deployment Price Adders and Reserves by SCED Interval" to "Real-Time Price Adders by SCED Interval" and include RTC+B specific data.

While the ORDC-related price adders will be going away under RTC+B and excluded from the new version of the report, there will still be a Real-Time Reliability Deployment Price Adder (RTRDPA) included in the new report. See both reports linked above for more details on the changes being made to adders post-RTC.

With RTC+B, ancillary services in the day-ahead market will be financially binding only. For both generation and load resources, ancillary service offers will be paid the day-ahead clearing price and settle any imbalances in the RT market.

The Updated Desired Base Point (UDBP) will be retired and replaced with the Updated Desired Set Point (UDSP). The UDSP includes information similar to the UDBP (i.e. four-minute ramp instruction) but now will also include resource-specific signals for regulation deployment.

Put another way, UDBP = four-minute ramp instruction, UDSP = four-minute ramp instruction + regulation instructions (as applicable).

RTC+B Market Trials data is dependent on participation in the trials and there has been high participation from QSEs in SCED market trials (compared to lower participation in DAM trials). ERCOT did have 100% QSE participation in the LFC closed-loop test on September 11, 2025. It is interesting to look at the data for September 11, 2025, between 10:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. CST. This is when ECROT was conducting its closed-loop LFC test, and RTC+B was the production system during this time. Based on initial observations, prices seemed to be comparable between current production and the RTC+B system.

Under RTC+B, the current system-wide offer cap (SWCAP) of $5,000/MWh is being replaced by a day-ahead system-wide offer cap (DASWCAP) equal to $5,000/MWh and a real-time system-wide offer cap (RTSWCAP) equal to $2,000/MWh. This replacement will happen at go-live. The system-wide offer caps are not to be confused with price caps. It is possible for the LMP to exceed offer cap prices, for example, due to extreme congestion, like we saw earlier this year as outlined in this Yes Energy blog post. However, under RTC+B the system lambda used to determine LMPs and the real-time MCPCs (ancillary service clearing prices) will be capped at the effective Value of Lost Load (VOLL), which is currently set to the DASWCAP of $5,000/MWh.

Yes, that is correct!

Collateral requirements are changing to capture the additional risk of ancillary service (AS) virtual offer activity in the DAM, and the changes may impact you. ERCOT released a market notice with more details on November 5,2025, citing two key credit reports with changes. However, these reports are certified, and as a result, Yes Energy is unable to collect them.

From an offer perspective, RTC+B does not change the fundamental market premise that energy and ancillary services are offered to the market based on the marginal cost to the resource of providing those services.

What will be new from an energy clearing price perspective is that the LMP calculation will now also include the opportunity cost of providing reserves. The expectation is that through the process of co-optimization, a more optimal, least-cost mix of energy and reserves will be achieved, resulting in lower overall costs to the system. These lower costs will be due in part to reduced energy prices, on average over time, relative to the energy prices that would be realized in the absence of co-optimization.

It's too early to say with certainty, as this is a new market feature. Virtual participation will add liquidity and market competition, which may have a material and disruptive impact on existing DART price spreads, particularly at the onset of the market launch. We anticipate that over time, the additional DAM liquidity will contribute to greater price convergence between the DA and RT, i.e., reduced DART spreads.

Virtual participation in the AS market under RTC+B will be purely financial, just like virtual energy offers/bids today, and will not require physical qualification to participate.